The Consciousness Paradox
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Consciousness, Concepts, and Higher-Order Thoughts

Rocco J. Gennaro
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To Deidra, Olivia, and Joseph
Contents

Acknowledgments 000

1 Introduction 000
   1.1 The Problem 000
   1.2 The Plan 000
   1.3 Some Terminology and Distinctions 000

2 In Defense of the HOT Thesis 000
   2.1 Varieties of Representationalism 000
   2.2 Defending Reductive Representationalism 000
   2.3 Consciousness and Intentionality 000
   2.4 HOT Theory: An Initial Defense 000
   2.5 More on Mental Content 000

3 Assessing Three Close Rivals 000
   3.1 First-Order Representationalism (FOR) 000
   3.2 Dual-Content Theory 000
   3.3 Higher-Order Perception (HOP) Theory 000

4 From HOT Theory to the Wide Intrinsicality View 000
   4.1 A False Dilemma 000
   4.2 Misrepresentation: A First Pass 000
   4.3 The Problem of the Rock 000
   4.4 The Hard Problem of Consciousness 000
   4.5 Objections and Replies 000

5 Against Self-Representationalism 000
   5.1 Three Views of State Consciousness 000
   5.2 Against Pure Self-Referentialism 000
   5.3 Another Approach: Peripheral Awareness 000
   5.4 Three More Attempts and a Counterargument 000