This is a bibliography of books and articles on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience over the last 34 years. There are three main sections, devoted to monographs, edited collections of papers, and articles. The first two of these sections are each divided into three subsections containing books in each of the main areas of research. The third section is divided into 12 subsections, with 10 subject headings for philosophical articles along with two additional subsections for articles in cognitive science and neuroscience. Of course the division is somewhat arbitrary, but I hope that it makes the bibliography easier to use.

This bibliography has first been compiled by Thomas Metzinger and David Chalmers to appear in print in two philosophical anthologies on conscious experience (Metzinger 1995a, b). From 1995 onwards it has been continuously updated by Thomas Metzinger, and now is freely available as a PDF-, RTF-, or HTML-file from his personal homepage at http://www.philosophie.uni-mainz.de/metzinger/. Other formats are available upon request. This bibliography mainly attempts to cover the Anglo-Saxon and German debates, in a non-annotated, fully formatted way that makes it easy to “cut and paste” from the original file. To a certain degree this bibliography also contains items in other languages than English and German - all submissions in other languages are welcome. Please submit new entries, errata etc. to metzinger@uni-mainz.de. Last update of current version: December 19th, 2004.
1. **MONOGRAPHS**

1.1 **PHILOSOPHY OF MIND**


1.2 Selected Readings: Cognitive Science & Psychology


1.3 SELECTED READINGS: NEUROSCIENCES


2. ANTHOLOGIES

2.1 PHILOSOPHY OF MIND


2.2 Selected Readings: Cognitive Science & Psychology


2.3 Selected Readings: Neurosciences


3. ARTICLES

3.1 THE CONCEPT OF CONSCIOUSNESS

This section contains articles analyzing the concept of consciousness, or attempting to determine what it is for an organism or a mental state to be conscious, or distinguishing various kinds of consciousness. Articles along these lines can also be found in sections 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and elsewhere.


Dretske, F. (1996). Phenomenal externalism, or if meanings ain’t in the head, where are qualia? In Villanueva 1996.


3.2 CONSCIOUSNESS, PHYSICALISM AND THE MIND-BODY PROBLEM

Is the existence of consciousness compatible with physicalism? The articles in this section address this question, and take various positions on this issue at the heart of the mind-body problem. This issue is also addressed by papers in most other sections, especially section 3.7.


3.3 CONSCIOUSNESS AS HIGHER-ORDER THOUGHT

A popular way to make sense of consciousness has been to analyze it in terms of the existence of some higher-order mental state - that is, a mental state that is itself directed at another mental state. Sometimes this higher-order state is taken to be a state of “inner perception” of another mental state, but more frequently (especially in the work of David Rosenthal) it has been taken to be a state of thought about another mental state. The papers cited here develop and critically address these suggestions. The issues are also addressed in chapters of some monographs in section 1.1, including Dennett 1991, Dretske 1995, Gennaro 1996 and Siewert 1994. See also the collection of texts in Gennaro 2004.


3.4 CONSCIOUSNESS AND INTENTIONALITY

There is plausibly a close relationship between consciousness and intentionality, but what exactly is the relationship? Is consciousness (or the potential for consciousness) required for intentionality? Do conscious states have intentional content, and if so, what sort of intentional content do they have? These questions and others are addressed in the papers in this section.


3.5 Dennett on Consciousness

An important reductive account of consciousness has been developed by Daniel Dennett over a period of many years, and has received wide attention from other researchers. Because these papers often do not fit naturally into the other subject-oriented sections, we have collected them into a single section here.


3.6 CONSCIOUSNESS: MISCELLANEOUS

This section contains miscellaneous philosophical articles on consciousness. These include very broad articles on the subject, as well as articles on smaller specific topics that do not have sections of their own.


Narayanan, A. (2002). All there is to the mind is to have the right genes, or, consciousness as a form of genetic engineering. Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science, Proceedings, 2464, 78-86.


### 3.7 **Knowing What It’s Like and the Knowledge Argument**

An important thread in the philosophical literature on consciousness concerns the relationship between our knowledge of our consciousness and our knowledge of the objective physical world. Thomas Nagel has argued that no amount of objective knowledge enables us to know *what it is like* to be a conscious being quite different from us. Frank Jackson has argued that someone who knows all the physical facts about the brain might still not know what it is like to see red, and has concluded (via the so-called “Knowledge Argument”; see Ludlow, Nagasawa & Stoljar 2004 for a recent edited collection) that physicalism is false. This section encompasses much of the large body of literature on these issues.


3.8 Absent Qualia and Inverted Qualia

A common objection to functionalist accounts of mind is that they do not capture all the facts about conscious experience, as we can always imagine the properties described in any given functional account being instantiated with no associated experience at all (the case of “absent qualia”) or with subjective experiences differing between functionally identical systems (“inverted qualia”, or the “inverted spectrum”). Others have disputed this possibility. This section includes papers covering many aspects of this debate.

3.9 Qualia: Miscellaneous

This section includes miscellaneous articles on qualia, or experiential properties, or phenomenal properties, as well as on specific sorts of experiences, such as color and pain experiences. Note that the division between many of these articles and those on “consciousness” is often only of a superficial nature.


475-92.
Supplement, 47, 107-19.
Science, 45, 527-47.
Künne, A. Newen & M. Anduschus (eds.), Direct Reference, Indexicality and
Propositional Attitudes. Stanford: CSLI.
Argumentatives Dilemma in der gegenwärtigen Diskussion über die
Subjektivität mentaler Zustände. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Die
Zeitschrift für allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie, 26, 269-95.
Northoff, G. (2003). Qualia and the ventral prefrontal cortical function -
'Neurophenomenological' hypothesis. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 10(8),
14-48.
Quarterly, 8, 1-12.
Sinneseigenschaften bei Descartes. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 80,
Pettit, P. (2003). Looks as powers (Colour problem, biconditionals, qualia). Nous, 221-
252, Sp. Iss. 13.
Metaphysics, 41, 685-706.
German translation in Metzanger 1995a.
Rey, G (forthcoming). Why Wittgenstein should have been a computationalist (and what a computationalist can learn from Wittgenstein). In D. Gottlieb & J. Odell (eds.), *Wittgenstein and Cognitive Science*.


Could a machine be conscious? Could there ever be artificial consciousness? In particular, is implementing an appropriate program on a computer in principle sufficient for consciousness? There has been continuing debate on this controversial question, focusing on such issues as Searle's “Chinese room” thought-experiment and the validity of the Turing test, among others. Many of the papers in section 3.8 and elsewhere are also quite relevant here.


3.11 Selection: The Problem of Consciousness in Psychology & Cognitive Science

This section includes a selection of papers on consciousness and related subjects in cognitive psychology and in cognitive science in general. This small selection is very far from complete.


Feel? A Neuroimaging Study of Perspective-Taking with Social Emotions. Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience, 16(6), 988-999.


3.12 SELECTION: THE PROBLEM OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE NEUROSCIENCES

This section includes a selection of papers addressing the problems related to consciousness from the perspective of neuroscience. These include neuroscientific theories of consciousness, articles on the binding problem, papers on blindsight and other specific phenomena, and papers addressing the general question of what neuroscience can tell us about consciousness, among other things. Again, this section is very far from complete.


