The Implicit Self In Perception

Aron Cohen

Washington University in St. Louis, Philosophy Department - Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program (PNP)

The Punch-Line

In this paper I argue that the implicitness of the self can serve to potentially explain distinctive features of phenomenal consciousness only if part of the contents of phenomenal consciousness are essentially self-involving relational facts and that the implicitness of the self is evidenced terms of uncinate constituent, in Perry’s sense (“93, “98), of phenomenal consciousness.

Introduction – Motivating the Problem. Why appeal to an implicit self?

An account to a self’s consciousness in the world’s modified contains of the world’s information (“71), we grossly the possibility of self-attribution and an awareness of our worldly knowledge (Eilan “93, “95).

To explain the possibility of self-attribution that are innate to through residentialization (Bratman “88, Eilan “93, Bermudez “99, Cosmos “94).

We regulate the attribution of the contents of conscious experiences.

A few examples of the latter:

\[ \text{Washington University in St. Louis, Philosophy Department - Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program (PNP)} \]

Acknowledgements and Contact information

Many thanks to Ben Ross for his help with this paper, as well as to the Washington University in St. Louis and CNS philosophy department for their support for this paper. Thanks also to the CNS Philosophy Department for help in finding the proper references to this paper.

For further details contact:

Philosophy Department
Washington University in St. Louis
St. Louis, Missouri 63130

Phone: (314) 935-4104
Email: ac4d@wustl.edu

Bibliography (included in the paper version)

Eilan (‘95)

A few examples of the latter:

Washington University in St. Louis, Philosophy Department - Philosophy-Neuroscience-Psychology Program (PNP)

Research questions and what is not argued for

What does it mean to say that the self is implicit rather than explicitly the content of perception in a way such that its being so could potentially explain distinctive features of our phenomenology?

The world-goal of the paper is to give a positive account of the implicit participation of the self in the contents of experience such that the implicitness of the self in the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

A proposed solution

Thus, in this sense the self is implicit in perception to a great extent but is perceived as part of the content of experience. Indeed, the self is perceived as part of the content of experience.

Problems with the causal/inferential account

The difficulty amounts to a question about the possibility of perceptually representing states of affairs involving n-ary relational properties with vehicles that contain only n-1-ary constituents.

The sense of ‘perceiving’ that we experience is not a propositional attitude that is essentially the case when the experience is marked as part of the content of experience.

Notes

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

1. The metaphysical objection

The more that a particular experience is of some property, as an attribute of just a part of some phenomenal content, and also some self-involving information (when it is the subject of the experience that is causally important in the phenomenal content), it is more that the self is an aspect of the phenomenal content.

The sense of “perceiving” that we experience is not a propositional attitude that is essentially the case when the experience is marked as part of the content of experience.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.

The implicitness of the self in the contents of perception is to explain the distinctiveness of the contents of phenomenal consciousness.