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ASSUMED EXISTENCE

A Reflection on Human Accountability
An Introduction

including

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ASSUMED EXISTENCE

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I (SELF) AFFIRMATION AND WILL

Man has the ability to affirm himself and his environment. With this ability he experiences himself being involved in a world: his world. Without this ability he would not be able to experience anything, and for him there would be no question of an ‘I’ or of a world with which that ‘I’ was inextricably linked.

Just as undeniable is the human will, which, in the personal history of an individual, rises whenever the situation in which he finds himself does not satisfy him. In other words, the human will rises each time man is confronted with a situation contrary to the one he was in. If such a situation does not present itself to him, his will will not rise. The existence of another ‘new’ reality is a condition of its awakening and, simultaneously, for the awakening of (self) affirmation or awareness: only a reality that distinguishes itself in some way from that which is considered the basic situation, can be confirmed. If an individual only knew the colour white, for example, then white would be the only existing colour for him and would, therefore, cease to be a colour. Only if another colour presented itself would distinction be possible and only then would the human will be able to make a choice.

Another example: if an individual had never eaten a certain kind of food, nor ever even heard of it, he could not experience a desire to eat it – it simply would not exist for him. It is only when it presents itself (he cannot search for it) and distinguishes itself from foods he already knows, that he can confirm it as something that until then did not exist for him. Only after it has distinguished itself from another kind of food does it exist, and only then can an individual develop an interest in it.

That which man experiences becomes meaningful through will. Without awareness man would not be able to experience, but without will his experience would have no meaning to him. Both are responsible for his experience, and one cannot exist without the other. An individual’s self-realisation gains form because of a succession of will-sought or unexpected experiences and he will experience his self-realisation as either positive or negative according to the quality of his will.
II REALITY

1. Reality
That which is affirmed by a (self) aware subject, is experienced as a reality – a reality which is unthinkable without materiality. He experiences materiality as such because, at the time of perception, he is unable to take up the same space as that which is taken up by other matter.

As well as materiality, man can distinguish immateriality through his affirmation of the material. Immateriality manifests itself to a subject in three ways which are closely linked to each other.

a) a sensory projection, either direct (if the subject observes a material reality through his senses) or indirect (if the subject imagines a material reality);

b) the meaning of the relevant reality for the self-realisation of the subject;

c) the word that is linked to the relevant reality.

Affirmation of reality ‘proves’ the existence of that reality and the existence of the subject’s ability to affirm himself. It is not possible to deny either: without ability, there would be no question of affirming reality; without reality, nothing remains to affirm – both of which are inconceivable. With nothing more than his ability, an individual would only be able to affirm himself, were it not that a reality other than himself is necessary for an affirmation because the existence of (self) affirmation depends on the presence of a contrast.

2. Assumed Reality
a) Directly-observed (assumed) reality (level of assumption 1)

Instead of saying the existence of a reality is proven by (self) affirmation, it would be better to say that it has been assumed - at least when the word ‘proven’ is used to mean a certainty of quality of the affirmation at the time of affirmation. One is dealing here with inertia of the ability to (self) affirm, which is a logical consequence of causality. The subject can only confirm something as a reality if it appears as a reality to him; in other words, if it already exists. Nothing which does not already exist can be confirmed. Therefore, that which is confirmed necessarily precedes the confirmation. A logical deduction then would be that the subject does not confirm the present state of a reality but its (recent) past, which has meanwhile adopted a new quality. This can be compared to seeing a star in the sky that no longer exists. What man sees is an image of the star’s past, the light of which has moved through time to reach the earth.

Because each confirmation of reality also has to be confirmed as a reality in order for it to become an experience, no confirmation is possible that does not take place in the past of the concerned reality – or rather: is assumed to have taken place. This process can be visualised by placing two mirrors opposite each
other. An infinite number of reflections are visible which each separately encompasses the previous image.

The subject, therefore, is always a step behind reality, including his own. The extreme consequence of this is that the last moment of his existence will remain unconfirmed by him. The term ‘present’ loses all value; there is only a past and a future, into which the present is included. This is comparable to the melting process of ice: first there is ice then there is water. The so-called ‘zero point’, as a middle point between the two stages, does not exist.

b) Indirectly-perceived (assumed) reality (level of assumption 2)

Indirect reality has to be assumed because it cannot be directly observed. The subject knows, for example, that his car is parked in front of his house, but this knowledge cannot be confirmed by means of perception in a direct sense. Knowing is assumption in this case. In the same way, the subject has to assume the existence of the molecules of the glass he is holding and the molecular structure of his drink as he cannot directly observe them, despite their direct presence.

A subsequent step further away from materiality (a 3rd level of assumption), is the assumption of the existence of reality outside the (affirming) presence of man: brutal reality. This assumption is, however, an impossible one: a reality which is not or cannot be confirmed is impossible.

3. (Self) affirmation with regard to will and assumed reality

The totality of what man might be able to imagine could be called ‘(assumed) totally-confirmable reality’, in which each affirmation is stated and of which each affirmation is a part. The selection made from that totality by human (self) awareness can be assumed to be extremely limited: direct perception is dependent on the ‘range’ of the senses, and indirect perception is dependent on the power of imagination. Other, more subtle perceptions can always be assumed.

As well as through the limited potential of ability, the (assumed) totally-confirmable reality is also selected by the subject’s will. It sends him, as it were, through the ‘totality’ searching for realities that are positive for his self-realisation. (Limited) ability and will create order for the subject. Because of this, the subject’s ‘part’ of the (assumed) totally-confirmable reality is a synoptic one in which the actual illusion of efficient operation can stand firm.

Efficiency of operation is dependent on exactitude expectation (gained from knowledge) and perception, but with regard to assumed total knowledge, these count for nothing, or very little. Human perception can be assumed to be extremely inaccurate measured by mankind’s own criteria. For example: the subject is about to take a penalty kick. He wants to kick the ball just above the
ground, close to the post and into the left-hand corner of the net. He shoots and the ball lands exactly where he wanted it to.

However, if he decided to kick the ball exactly 4 cm above ground level (assuming maximum function of measuring equipment and totally flat ground) and 12 cm from the left post, then he could be 99.9% sure of failure. His reality-affirmation ability is too limited for him to succeed. For him to succeed, he would need to know, among other things, the wind speed, the exact spot where his foot would come into contact with the ball, the exact effect of the kick, and so on.

There always seem to be influences outside an individual’s ability that make such effectiveness impossible. However, exactitude of expectation and perception determine whether or not he notices this. If he did indeed succeed, he might put it down to luck (or coincidence).

III ACCOUNTABILITY

1. The subject as a witness of his past in an assumed present

Self-realisation can only be assumed to take place and only its past can be confirmed. The subject lags, as it were, behind his present and only gathers knowledge from his past: knowledge that serves as the source of his expectations with regard to his future (including his present). This process can best be clarified by the following schedule:

A person walks from A to B, but he walks backwards, facing departure point A. He has an overview of the route he has taken. His perception forms an assumption that is corrected and defined with every step, so much so that the possibility of being confronted with surprises would almost not occur to him. The
impression of control (which cannot exist anyway because in time a subject is ‘one subject’, a hierarchically inseparable entity, unable to split without losing that entity) is hereby stripped of reality. The subject takes action, confirms that action, confirms his confirmation of that action, and so on, but this all takes place in an assumed present, on which (self) awareness has absolutely no influence. The subject is entirely a ‘becoming-aware-self’, of which the ‘aware-self’ is a part.

A = (total): ‘becoming-aware-self’
B = (part of A): ‘aware-self’
The volume of awareness of B2 exists because of affirmations of A1; that of B3 because of affirmations of A2, and so on.

Because the ability of (self) affirmation sticks closely to what happens, the possibility of ‘self-alienation’ is limited. The subject must, however, regularly verify that his self-awareness has continued without him: during sleep, for example, or while automatically lighting a cigarette, or committing a crime in a fit of insanity. This is, however, continuously the case and as such is verifiable.

2. Human Accountability

The above throws a special light on human accountability. Most common law systems state that a person is more accountable for his actions if they are consciously performed than if they are unconsciously performed. This assumes a link between consciousness and accountability: he who acts consciously directs his actions and is therefore fully accountable for them. (‘consciousness’ here means that a certain action has been deliberately chosen for a certain objective, as opposed to being conscious of an action taking place). In the previous sections, however, it has been shown that no substantial difference can be made between conscious and unconscious in this matter. As the subject must first be aware of all actions (including the ‘action’ of becoming aware) before they exist for him, every action must be considered an unconscious one.

As stated in Part III, 1, the subject is entirely a ‘becoming-aware-self’, of which the ‘aware-self’ is a part. The subject observes his own past actions (including those of thinking about carrying out a future action) and is therefore solely accountable because he, and no-one else, carried out these actions. But
together with the reality of his present action, his accountability for it lingers in the shadows of his near future.

IV SUMMARY

- Reality is subject-linked.
- Reality attached to materiality is itself the affirmation of materiality. Immateriality affirms materiality.
- Will and (self) affirmation rise simultaneously when the individual experiences reality (including that of himself).
- The individual experiences one reality as soon as it distinguishes itself from another.
- Will gives meaning to reality.
- (Self) affirmation confirms the reality’s past (including that of the subject or the affirmation itself) and has to assume its present.
- The subject as a whole is a ‘becoming-aware-self’ in an assumed present, of which the ‘aware-self’ (his confirmed past) is a part.
- Every action (at the moment of action) is (still) unconscious, as a result of which accountability for that action can not be coupled to consciousness. The subject acknowledges his own actions.
The Frimistic Theory of Needs

1. Birth as the origin of need

The stage of life after birth is characterised by a deficiency, by a lack of what was naturally present during the antenatal stage: care and protection. Being born instantly necessitates an experience of need, and an experience of a desire to satisfy that need: the human will. There is no choice. If man wants to live, if he wants to lead a satisfying life, he has to try to satisfy his needs. If he lacks care (the satisfaction of his physiological need for oxygen, liquid, food, space and rest), his existence is in danger, and if he lacks protection, the level of his well-being becomes an issue.

2. Necessary egoism

Complete satisfaction of the need for security seems to be impossible. In comparison to the antenatal stage, each situation of security is a substitute. The lack of total security after birth remains, to a certain degree, in contrast to the optimal security of life in the womb. It is the (unconscious) attempt to minimize or remove the contrast between the primary state and the surrogate that controls man’s activities.

His inability to succeed in this may explain the never-ending state of dissatisfaction in which man finds himself. Breaking away from the antenatal existence forces him to strive for self-conservation and self-protection; man’s existence is, therefore, one of necessary egoism.

3. Desire versus disappointment

To satisfy his need for security, man sets himself goals that represent positive value with regard to that need. Each goal is, as it were, an ideal goal, a projection of the antenatal state of security (in which need, under normal circumstances, did not manifest itself), with an imagined optimal level of satisfaction when achieved.
Because achieving each set goal produces a level of satisfaction disproportionate to that which was desired, disappointment rises. This disappointment is accelerated when less is achieved than was desired. It is slowed, however, when man’s desires were less than what was achieved. In this case, disappointment is still an issue as the satisfaction of the ideal goal has not been achieved.

4. ‘Final situation’ versus needs for freedom

The above situation of achieving more than was desired can lead to a so-called ‘final situation’: a situation in which the contrast with the proceeding situation of desire and the created expectation pattern has dissolved. The desired goal seems to have been achieved, but man will still begin to feel dissatisfied. From this situation, he will set himself new goals that are often of a contrasting nature: he creates ‘new space for desire’ in order to give meaning to his existence. The need to do this can be defined as the human need for freedom.

Examples of such a desire to reach a contrasting situation after finding oneself in a ‘final situation’ could be: a successful person wishing he still had something to strive for, or someone longing to be cool during the summer heat he had deeply desired.

5. Antagonism

In spite of these restrictions there appears to be one specific situation which is relatively satisfying: a situation in which man strives for security or, from a ‘final situation’, for freedom (insecurity), and in an optimal way experiences the desired reality when the contrast is also present.

Strong sensations of security can be experienced, for example, when one sits beside a campfire on a cold night, or when one watches a horror movie with a loved one in the safety of his own home. Similarly, strong feelings of freedom can be experienced when one drives to the coast and strips himself of recent negative experiences during a walk along the beach. In both cases a balanced contrast between two opposite realities guarantees an experience of satisfaction. As soon as this contrast fades away, however, a new ‘final situation’ inevitably threatens to present its dissatisfying qualities.

6. Self-conditioning
Man continues striving for optimal satisfaction of his needs without ever actually succeeding; each (postnatal) satisfaction appears to be relative. The only ‘weapon’ against the disillusioned effects of striving for satisfaction seems to be a way of life in which man tries to end this striving or tries to oppose to his own nature. Some of the possibilities to do so are:

a) Man could choose to no longer strive for the satisfaction of desire, but for the sublimation it. An example of this can be found in the lifestyle of 12th century French Provencal’s troubadours who honoured high-placed and therefore unobtainable women without longing to fulfil their desires. A kiss on the hand was all that was admissible. When realized, it formed an exciting and artistically inspiring contrast to their preceding state of longing.

b) Man could strive for the satisfaction of desire but be conscious of the effects of its realization and therefore be geared for disappointment. This could result in the disappointment partially or fully disappearing.

c) Man could strive for goals which represent the opposite of that which he actually desires. By searching for security if one he has need of insecurity, and vice versa, one can escape from disappointment.

d) Man could adopt the behaviour of allowing coincidence and surprise to play a larger role in his life, whereby he would seldom be confronted with disappointment (as one cannot have expectations of the unknown). This behaviour would involve man not making future plans and trying only to live for the moment.

e) A final form of self-conditioning is found in the brutal removal of a situation that is experienced as a ‘final situation’. As soon as man no longer experiences satisfaction because of the disappearance of a conscious contrast, he has to create such a contrast for himself; for example by wilfully irritating his partner during a cosy evening in front of the television in order to force an argument that offers appealing new options for reconciliation.
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