The Case Against Cognitive Phenomenology

Document Type: 
Article
Article Type: 
Theoretical
Disciplines: 
Philosophy
Topics: 
Phenomenology
Keywords: 
cognitive phenomenology, thought, concept, experience, content
Deposited by: 
Peter Carruthers
Contact email: 
pcarruth@umd.edu
Date of Issue: 
2011
Authors: 
Peter Carruthers, Bénédicte Veillet
Title of Book: 
Cognitive Phenomenology
Place of Publication: 
Oxford
Publish status: 
Unpublished
Abstract: 
The goal of this chapter is to mount a critique of the claim that cognitive content (that is, the kind of content possessed by our concepts and thoughts) makes a constitutive contribution to the phenomenal properties of our mental lives. We therefore defend the view that phenomenal consciousness is exclusively experiential (or nonconceptual) in character. The main focus of the chapter is on the alleged contribution that concepts make to the phenomenology of visual experience. For we take it that if cognitive phenomenology is to be found anywhere, it should be found here. However, we begin with a discussion of the question of cognitive phenomenology more generally, and we close by sketching how our argument might be extended into the domain of non-perceptual thought.
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