On bringing consciousness into the house of science - with the help of husserlian phenomenology
Keywords:structures of consciousness, mental imagery, neuroscience, phenomenological methodology
Deposited by:Prof. Dr. Eduard Marbach
Date of Issue:2005
Abstract:This paper joins attempts at methodologically controlled ways of integrating scientific third-person data related to consciousness and phenomenological first-person data pertaining to conscious experiences. It argues that neuroscientific research into the finer details of conscious experiences with the new brain imaging techniques should not simply rely on everyday introspection and mental concepts. Rather, when conscious experiences are the subject-matter, recourse to phenomenologically clarified concepts along Husserlian lines should become the norm. Taking up some recent neuroscientific work on mental imagery by Kosslyn et al. and using a simple formalism, namely a phenomenological notation for designating components and structural relationships inherent in the re-presentational conscious experiences under study, the paper suggests that phenomenology ought to play a heuristic function in neuroscientific research concerning consciousness.