Must We Neglect A Physicalists’ Intuition About Mary?

Document Type: 
ASSC Conference Item
Article Type: 
Theoretical
Disciplines: 
Philosophy
Topics: 
Neural Correlates of Consciousness
Keywords: 
Mary, Jackson, knowledge, qualia, physicalist, epistemology, intuition,
Deposited by: 
Dr. Steven R. Brown
Date of Issue: 
2007
Authors: 
Steven Ravett Brown
Event Dates: 
22-25 June 2007
Event Location: 
Las Vegas, NV, USA
Event Title: 
ASSC 11
Event Type: 
ASSC Conference
Presentation Type: 
Poster
Number of Pages: 
1
Official URL: 
http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu
Alternative URL: 
http://eprints.assc.caltech.edu
Abstract: 
Jackson’s knowledge argument about Mary is based on the intuition (I) by Jackson that Mary knows all physical facts (i.e., possesses all knowledge of the physical world, an epistemological claim), but has no phenomenal experiences of color (“color qualia”). However, there are actually two competing intuitions in this well-known scenario: Jackson’s, above, and a physicalists’ (P), which claims that without the experiences of color, Mary cannot know all physical facts. I will show in this essay that (P) can in fact be supported though a combination of logic and empirical data, and more strongly than (I).
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