Decision-Making Experiments Under a Philsophical Perspective

Document Type: 
ASSC Conference Item
Article Type: 
Neural Correlates of Consciousness
deision-making, philosophical analysis
Deposited by: 
Gabriel Mograbi
Contact email:
Date of Issue: 
Mograbi, g.

DECISION-MAKING EXPERIMENTS UNDER A PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVEKeywords: Decision-making; Inhibition; attention; neurophilosophyDecision-Making is an intricate subject in neuroscience. It is often argued that laboratorial research is not capable of dealing with the necessary complexity to study such issue. Whereas philosophers in general neglect the physiological features that constitute the main aspects of thought and behaviour, I advocate that a philosophical analysis of cutting-edge experiments on decision-making can offer us a framework to explain human behaviour in its relationship with will, self-control, inhibition, emotion and reasoning. It s my contention that self-control mechanisms can modulate more basic stimuli.       Assuming the aforementioned standpoints, I show the physiological mechanisms underlying social assessment and decision-making. I  also establish a difference between veridical and adaptive decision-making useful to create experimental designs that can better mimic the complexity of  our day-by-day decisions in more ecologically relevant laboratorial research. Veridical decision-making presupposes the idea that of one of the answers is the only correct. Although, the great majority of our choice is adaptive and don't have a unique transpersonal correct answer. Adaptive decision-making, is particularly dependent on the frontal lobes, differently  from veridical decision-making. The ecological relevance of experiments dealing with adaptive decision-making is superior than of those dealing with veridical decision-making: Moreover, I analyse some experiments in order to develop an epistemological reflection about the necessary neural mechanisms to social assessment and decision-making.       Philosophically and technically analysing experiments, I show that attention and inhibition are the key topics to understand how our choices are taken. I critically analyse experiments on decision-making and conscious and subliminal assessment aiming to show how inhibition and attention are related. I show that attention and inhibition are necessary capacities to conscious decision-making.       The more semantically loaded and interpreted character of frontal lobes' information processing constitute my epistemic credentials to sustain that sheer determinism applied to living creatures, especially human beings is so nonsensical as the metaphysical freedom of the will. I present empirical evidence of how higher-cognitive functions could control more basic stimuli and interpret that as the underlying necessary conditions to decision-making. 

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