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ASSC 17 Meeting Registration Fee for Non-Members (July 12th-15th) -
Early Registration (By May 20th, 2013*) - $575.00 US:
*All payments must be received by June 12th and will not be refundable after that date. Refunds made prior to June 12th will be subject to a 15% processing fee.
Optional Morning Tutorials (9:00am-12:00pm, July 12th) - $60.00 US each (you can only select 1 morning and/or 1 afternoon tutorial):
TUTORIAL M1 - 9:00am: Using Bayes to Interpret Non-significant Results Zoltan Dienes
TUTORIAL M3 - 9:00AM: First-Person Methods: Philosophers' Dreams or Researchers' Nightmares? Perspectives from Philosophy and the Study of Dreaming Jennifer M. Windt & Sascha Benjamin Fink
TUTORIAL M4 - 9:00AM: Measuring (Un)awareness David Carmel & Steve Fleming
Optional Afternoon Tutorials (1:00pm-4:00pm, July 12th)- $60.00 US each (you can only select 1 morning and/or 1 afternoon tutorial):
TUTORIAL A1 - 1:00PM: Investigating Animal Pain and Consciousness Paula Droege & Victoria Braithwaite
TUTORIAL A2 - 1:00PM: Representational Theories of Consciousness Rocco Gennaro
TUTORIAL A3 - 1:00PM: The Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness Giulio Tononi, Christof Koch, Nao Tsuchiya & Masafumi Oizumi
TUTORIAL A4 - 1:00PM: Deciphering the information contained in patterns of human brain activity Frank Tong
Optional Satellite Symposium - Perception and Action in Immersive Worlds (July 16th) - $60.00 US:
This is a satellite event that is independent of the main ASSC17 conference.
The perfect way to relax after a big day, and an ideal chance to meet other conference participants. The food will be delicious, the company brilliant.
*Includes beer and wine served during dinner.
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Poster Composition: All posters should include the following: 1) A title in large type with author names and affiliations clearly printed below; 2) the abstract as originally submitted for review; 3) a brief introduction describing the nature and/or history of the problem under investigation; 4) a clear summary of results if the poster is presenting new scientific research; and 5) conclusions in the form of bullet points or a concise descriptive paragraph. Wherever possible, the use of figures and tables is strongly encouraged.
Poster Size: The maximum dimensions for posters are 72 inches wide x 44 inches high (or 182.8 cm. wide x 110 cm. high).
M1: Using Bayes to interpret non-significant results
Zoltan Dienes (School of Psychology, University of Sussex, Brighton, U.K.)
The purpose of the tutorial is to present simple tools for dealing with non-significant results. In particular, people will be taught how to apply Bayes Factors to draw meaningful inferences from non-significant data, using free easy-to-use on-line software: Software which allows one to determine whether there is strong evidence for the null and against one’s theory, or if the data are just insensitive, a distinction p-values cannot make. These tools have greater flexibility than power calculations and allow null results to be interpreted over a wider range of situations. Such tools should allow the publication of null results to become easier.
While the tools will be of interest to all scientists, they are especially relevant to researchers interested in the conscious/unconscious distinction, because inferring a mental state is unconscious often rests on affirming a null result. For example, for perception to be below an objective threshold, discrimination about stimulus properties must be at chance. Similarly, for perception to be below a subjective threshold by the zero correla- tion criterion, ability to discriminate one’s own accuracy must be at chance. To interpret a non-significant result, what is needed is a non-arbitrary specification of the distribution of discrimination abilities given conscious knowledge. Conventional statistics cannot solve this problem, but Bayes Factors provide an easy simple solution. The solution is vital for progress in the field, as so many conclusions of unconscious mental states rely on null results with no indication of whether the non-significant result is purely due to data insensitivity.
M2: Integrated information, predictive coding, and qualia
Anil. K. Seth & Ryota Kanai (Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science and Dep’t of Informatics, University of Sussex, Brighton, U.K.)
Current research in consciousness science must better integrate theory and experiment in developing our understanding of qualia [1]. Two classes of brain theory are now emerging as leading candidates. Integrated information theory (IIT, [2]) proposes that consciousness has to do with the amount of information generated by a neural system as a whole, compared to the sum of its parts. Integrated information (‘phi’) can be operational- ized as a variant of dynamical complexity and compared with similar measures [3,4]. IIT thus highlights informa- tion theory and complexity as key tools for naturalizing consciousness and qualia. Predictive coding (PC) proposes that perception emerges via Bayesian inference: Perceptual content is determined top-down predictive signals arising from generative models of external causes, which are continually modified by bottom-up prediction-error signals [5]. PC thus highlights re-entrant processing and probabilistic inference as key concepts. While both frameworks are powerfully explanatory, IIT is underconstrained by current cognitive neuroscience and difficult to test, while for PC the relationship between conscious and unconscious perception is poorly specified. In this tutorial, we will first provide basic introduction to IIT and PC with special emphasis on their relationship to understanding qualia. To facilitate interdisciplinary discussion, the tutorial does not assume any mathematical background and we will focus on conceptual understanding of the theories rather than math- ematical details. In a later part of the tutorial, we will discuss how these different frameworks might be synthesized into a coherent computational framework.
M3: First-person methods: Philosophers' dreams or researchers' nightmares? Perspectives from philosophy and the study of dreaming
Jennifer M. Windt (Dep’t of Philosophy, University of Mainz, DE) & Sascha B. Fink (Institute of Cognitive Science, University of Osnabrück, DE)
The best way to learn about the specific character of conscious experience is to study what people say about it. Fundamental features of consciousness (e.g. holistic integration, phenomenal embodiment, specious presence, etc.) were only established as targets for consciousness research through first-person methods. Most agree that such methods are indispensable for consciousness studies. At the same time, phenomena such as change blindness suggest that first-person access to phenomenality is not perfect. First-person reports can be confabulated, contradictory, or incomplete. This calls the validity of first-person approaches into question. Apparently, we need first-person reports – but how far can we trust them?
Dreams illustrate the problem of first-person reports in a compelling manner. Because dreams are largely decoupled from sensory input and behavioral output, dream researchers rely almost exclusively on dream reports. At the same time, dream reports have often been taken to be particularly unreliable, occasionally leading to outright skepticism regarding the experiential character of dreaming. Despite these theoretical disagreements, however, dream research is a thriving field and can provide a fresh perspective on problems
The tutorial has four goals: (1) Provide an introduction to the basic problems raised by first-person reports using the example of dreaming, (2) suggest specific consequences from the philosophical debate on dream- ing for the use of first-person reports in consciousness research, (3) discuss philosophical positions on the validity of first-person reports and the reliability of introspection, and (4) discuss the role and value of the researcher’s own experience.
M4: Measuring (un)awareness
David Carmel (Dep’t of Psychology, University of Edinburgh) & Steve Fleming (Center for Neural Science, New York University)
Most research on perceptual awareness attempts to understand consciousness by investigating the twin themes of conscious and unconscious perception – i.e., what perceptual processes are associated with conscious experience and what can be accomplished in the absence of awareness. There is, however, a great deal of confusion regarding how to assess and measure each of these modes of perceptual processing. This tutorial will offer researchers at all levels an overview of pertinent methodological and conceptual issues, leaving participants with an understanding of the questions they need to consider when designing studies, and how the answers to these questions constrain the conclusions that can be drawn from research findings. For unconscious perception, the questions that will be discussed include how to ensure suppression of percep- tual stimuli from awareness, how to decide which suppression technique is most appropriate for a specific research question, and whether different kinds of unconscious processing indicate similar neural underpin- nings.
For conscious processing, the questions that will be addressed are how to measure the level and extent of subjective conscious experience, whether different ways of assessing reports of awareness (confidence, appearance, wagering) address equivalent constructs, and how detection and identification of perceptual stimuli differ.
Several demonstrations will clarify the issues that will be discussed, and generous provision for discussion will be made to allow consideration of specific problems or issues arising in participants’ own research.
Afternoon (1300-1600):
A1: Investigating animal pain and consciousness
Paula Droege (Dep't of Philosophy, Pennsylvania State University) & Victoria Braithwaite (Dep’t of Fisheries and Biology, Pennsylvania State University)
Neuroscientists have been making remarkable progress in identifying candidates for the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) in humans. Through careful investigation of conscious and unconscious processes, the role of thalamocortical circuits and information integration in the production of consciousness is becoming clearer. But what about non-human animals? How can we apply the advances in consciousness research to animals (e.g. fish, cephalopods) that share few if any human physical and functional structures? The capacity to represent the current environment in contrast to the past and future is essential for consciousness and marks an important development in cognitive skill. We suggest this capacity for temporal representation can bring together physiological and behavioral evidence to help determine which animals are conscious and which are not.
The tutorial will begin with a discussion of the problems and prospects for research on animal consciousness, considering such questions as: Is nociception sufficient for pain? What is the relation between consciousness and self-consciousness? Then we will review several research paradigms designed to assess consciousness in animals. One important question here is: When is an explanation in terms of higher-level processes such as consciousness and cognition simpler than an explanation in terms of associative conditioning?
A2: Representational theories of consciousness
Rocco J. Gennaro (Dep’t of Philosophy, University of Southern Indiana)
The notion of ‘representation’ is central to many philosophical theories of consciousness and also figures importantly in psychology and neuroscience. Some questions raised by the role of representation in these fields are: What does it mean to say that a mental state is ‘representational’? What is the difference between a first-order representation and a higher-order (or meta-) representation? This tutorial will begin with a discus- sion of how the concept ‘representation’ is used in the philosophical literature on consciousness. In addition, various senses of ‘conscious’ are distinguished and explained. The key question then becomes: What makes a mental state a conscious mental state? We shall survey a number of leading representational theories of consciousness found in the current literature: First-Order Representational Theory of Consciousness (Tye), Higher-Order Perception (HOP) Theory (Lycan), Higher-Order Thought (HOT) Theory (Rosenthal), Dual Content Theory (Carruthers), and Self-Representational Theory (Kriegel). After the main tenets of each approach are presented, we shall discuss the arguments for and against the theory in question. Significant attention will be paid to well-known objections to each theory, for example, the problem of misrepresentation, the question of animal consciousness, and how these theories might address the “hard problem” of consciousness. Finally, there will be some discussion of how these models might be realized in the brain. Also important is the reduc- tionist motive of most representational theorists: Can any of these theories offer a viable reductionist account of consciousness?
A3: The Integrated Information theory of consciousness
Giulio Tononi (Dep’t of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin), Christof Koch (Cognitive and Behavioral Biology, Cal Tech; CSO, Allen Institute for Brain Science), Nao Tsuchiya (Monash University, Melbourne, AU) & Masafumi Oizumi (Dep’t of Psychiatry, University of Wisconsin)
The Integrated Information theory of consciousness (IIT) has recently attracted attention among conscious- ness researchers. IIT stems from thought experiments that lead to phenomenological axioms and onto- logical postulates (information, integration, exclusion, and compositionality). According to IIT, an experi- ence is an integrated information structure, which in principle can be completely characterized, both in quantity and quality, by determining to what extent a system of causal mechanisms is irreducible to its parts. Many observations concerning the neural substrate of consciousness fall naturally into place within the IIT framework. Among them are the association of consciousness with certain neural systems rather than with others; the fact that neural processes underlying consciousness can influence or be influenced by neural processes that remain unconscious; the reduction of consciousness during dreamless sleep and generalized epileptic seizures; and the distinct role of different cortical architectures in affecting the quality of experience. The tutorial will i) introduce the basic notions of IIT to a broad audience without requiring a mathematical background, and provide hands-on examples in which integrated information can be computed rigorously; ii) introduce measures of integrated information that can be applied to empirical data and discuss how they can be applied to evaluate the level of consciousness in wake, sleep, anesthesia, and disorders of consciousness; iii) demonstrate how integrated information grows in animats adapting to a complex environment, thereby shedding light on the evolution of consciousness; iv) consider theoretical and practical aspects of measures of integrated information, potential problems, and future developments.
Our intended audience is broad. We do not assume any prior knowledge of integrated information theory or information theory in general. In the first part of the tutorial, we start from the basics of the probability theory and information theory, which are key to understanding the theory. After the introduction of the basics, the contents of the tutorial will be at the level of a master class.
A4: Deciphering the information contained in patterns of human brain activity
Frank Tong (Dep’t of Psychology, Vanderbilt University)
Surprisingly detailed information about visual and mental states can be decoded from non-invasive mea- sures of human brain activity. Brain decoding approaches have successfully revealed what a person is seeing, perceiving, attending to, or remembering. Multidimensional models can further be used to investi- gate how the brain encodes complex visual scenes or abstract semantic information, and to reconstruct the stimulus that was viewed. Such feats of “brain reading” or “mind reading”, though impressive, raise impor- tant conceptual, methodological, as well as ethical issues. What does successful decoding reveal about the sensory or cognitive functions performed by a brain region? How should brain signals be spatially selected and mathematically combined, to ensure that decoding reflects inherent computations of the brain rather than those performed by the decoder? What ethical considerations might emerge with the advancement of these methodologies? The tutorial will cover the fundamentals of “brain reading”, and should be suitable for people from a broad range of backgrounds, with one component emphasizing the more technical and mathematical aspects of pattern classification. Questions and interactive discussion will be emphasized, especially when considering the strengths and limitations of fMRI pattern analysis methods.
The role of prefrontal cortex in conscious experience
Chair: Richard Brown (Dep’t of Philosophy, CUNY)
One major divide in consciousness theory is that between higher-order and first-order theories. Inter- preted anatomically, first-order theories of consciousness maintain that consciousness will depend on the activity in the sensory cortices alone while higher-order theories deny that and maintain that consciousness will be reflected, at least in part, in activity of higher-order areas of the brain, most likely frontal-parietal regions.
Virtually all theories of consciousness have a stake in this debate. For instance, besides higher-order thought, and self representational views, Global Workspace Theory, and Information Integration Theory can be seen as versions of higher-order theory in that they posit a role for prefrontal areas in conscious perception, at least in some cases. Also in addition to first-order representation views, recurrent feedback, and attention-based theories can all be seen as versions of the first-order view.
This symposium will bring together two neuroscientists and two philosophers to present the empirical and philosophical case for and against the involvement of the prefrontal cortex in conscious experience.
Local neuronal “ignitions” and perceptual awareness Rafi Malach (Dep’t of Neurobiology, Weizmann Institute of Science, Tel Aviv, IL)
There are no unconscious phenomenal states Joseph Levine (Dep’t of Philosophy, U. Massachusetts, Amherst)
Higher order attentional contributions to subjective perception Dobromir Rahnev (Dep’t of Philosophy, U. California, Berkeley)
Consciousness without first-order representations Richard Brown (Dep’t of Philosophy, CUNY)
July 14th (1030-1230):
Projecting bodily consciousness: How the body affects consciousness in personal, peripersonal and interpersonal space
Chairs: Olaf Blanke (Cognitive Neuroscience, Ecole Polytechnique, Lausanne, CH), Thomas Metzinger (Dep’t of Philosophy, Universität Mainz, DE)
Philosophy of mind, cognitive neuroscience, and neurology stress the importance of bodily input in forming of the experience of self and person. Such bodily aspects of self-consciousness have been shown to arise from the complex integration of interoceptive and exteroceptive body-related signals. An intrigu- ing aspect of bodily self consciousness is that it is not limited to the body itself, but also depends on stimuli related to external objects and in turn influences the experience of the external world. In this sense, bodily self-consciousness extends beyond the limits of our body over the space around us (i.e. peripersonal space) and impacts the interaction with other humans.
The presentations of this symposium will highlight complementary findings from multisensory, motor, and affective approaches and discuss their relavance for self-consciousness. Roy Salomon will focus on how bodily information, that has been shown to alter self-consciousness, can also modulate visual consciousness.
Andrea Serino will show how the boundaries of peripersonal space adapt when interacting with objects and others. Federique de Vignemont will extend the notion of embodiment to the study of social interactions and intersubjectivity.
Spatial boundaries of Body-self Consciousness Andrea Serino (Cognitive Neuroscience, U. Bologna, IT )
Seeing other people’s bodies Frédérique de Vignemont (Dep’t of Philosophy, Institut Jean Nicod/CNRS, Paris, FR)
July 15th (0930-1130):
Beyond the contrastive method: How to separate the neural correlates of consciousness from its precursors and consequences
Chair: Lucia Melloni (Dep’t of Neurophysiology, MPI Frankfurt, DE/Columbia University)
The most prevalent approach to study the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) today is to contrast conditions in which conscious perception occurs with conditions in which it does not. Here, conscious- ness is treated as the dependent variable and then correlated with brain activity. This “contrastive method” has brought about important insights into the NCC. However, despite this apparently straight- forward approach, results are inconclusive and contradictory (e.g., it is still debated whether the NCC occurs early or late, or whether it is expressed in local or distributed brain activity). This discord can be understood when considering a methodological pitfall in the contrastive method: The contrast between conscious perception and unconscious processing confounds the NCC with processes that necessarily precede and follow conscious perception (pre-NCC and post-NCC, respectively) without directly contrib- uting to subjective experience.
It is not straightforward to arbitrate which previous results address the NCC-proper and which reflect other processes. In this symposium we will outline the shortcomings of the contrastive analysis, put forward a new taxonomy that differentiates the processes besetting the NCC- proper, and propose novel experimental approaches to dissociate the NCC-proper from its antecedents and consequences. We review M-EEG and ECOG studies that have employed these new approaches to probe which neural process directly correspond to the NCC. This evidence suggests that previous results may have indeed missed the NCC and reported pre-NCC/post-NCCs. Finally, we will discuss how this new taxonomy relates to prevalent theories of consciousness, arguing that some theories might be about post-NCCs instead of NCC.
Distilling the Neural Correlates of Consciousness Lucia Melloni (Dep’t of Neurophysiology, MPI Frankfurt/Columbia University)
Using MEG to track conscious access and its non-conscious consequences Stanislas Dehaene, Lucie Charles (Inserm-CEA Cognitive Neuroimaging Unit, Paris, FR)
Isolating NCCs that are necessary and sufficient for visual awareness Michael Pitts (Dep’t of Psychology, Reed College)
Core vs. Total NCC Ned Block (Dep’t of Philosophy, New York University)
July 15th (1630-1830):
Ethical implications of detecting covert awareness in disorders of consciousness
Chairs: Adrian M. Owen (Cognitive Neuroscience and Imaging, University of Western Ontario, CA), Andrew Peterson (Rotman Institute of Philosophy, University of Western Ontario, CA)
Recent findings in cognitive neuroscience (Monti et al .2010, Owen et al.2006) suggest that functional mag- netic resonance imaging (fMRI) may be a viable means for detecting covert awareness in the vegetative state (VS). This research opens a promising new avenue for developing brain-computer interfaces (Naci et al. 2012) that compliment the current diagnostic criteria of disorders of consciousness (DOC), thereby increasing the effectiveness of diagnostic screening in this patient group. Given the high rate of misdiagno- sis in this population (Andrews et al. 1996, Childs et al. 1993), actively seeking out patients, who retain conscious awareness despite a clinical diagnosis of VS, is of the highest importance. Moreover, this tech- nique may also permit patients, who are consciously aware and have high levels of preserved cognition, to meaningfully engage in the decision making process related to their own medical care. To date, one patient, previously diagnosed as vegetative for approximately five years, was able to successfully answer a series of autobiographical ‘yes’ or ‘no’ questions correctly overrepeated fMRI scanning sessions (Montietal.2010).
A natural step forward in this research program, therefore, is to apply similar neuroimaging methods to address medical questions relevant to individual DOC patients (Peterson et al. in preparation). Though these scientific findings appear highly promising in principle, incorporating any neuroimaging--based method into clinical setting will require satisfaction of established ethical and legal norms of medical practice. In particular, these concerns include: determining how information acquired from such techniques will be disclosed to patients’ families, what the cost of running such tests will be, whether any individual DOC patient is capable of making medically relevant decisions with these techniques, and what type of ques- tions we ought to be asking this patient population. We propose a symposium that brings together three different perspectives on this problem: neuroscience, neurology, and clinical ethics.
The first perspective, offered by Drs. Lorina Naci PhD and Daniel Bor PhD, both neuroscientists working with these neuroimaging paradigms, will shed light on practical obstacles and ways forward focusing neuroimaging to assess residual cognition in DOC patients.
The second perspective, offered by Dr. Bryan Young MD, a clinical neurologist working directly with this patient group, will highlight the difficulties as well as the potential that neuroim- aging holds for DOC patients in the medical setting.
Finally, Dr. Charles Weijer MD, PhD and Andrew Peterson MA, both medical ethicists and philosophers of science, will offer views on the overarching ethical standards relevant to this research. Dr. Adrian M. Owen, a neuroscientist working in this field, will chair the session.
We hope that this interdisciplinary approach will facilitate a novel and productive conversation about the merits of this research and future directions for using it in the clinical setting.
Using fMRI to assess conscious awareness in patients with disorders of consciousness– practical considerations Lorina Naci (Experimental Psychology, University of Western Ontario, CA)
Using multiple neuroimaging techniques to assess the quality of conscious awareness in DOC patients Daniel Bor (Cognitive Neuroscience, Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, University of Sussex, Brighton, U.K.)
Obstacles at the interface between advances in cognitive neuroscience and clinical practice Bryan Young (Neurology and Critical Care Medicine, University of Western Ontario, CA)
Conceptual foundations for assessing decision-making capacity in disorders of consciousness Andrew Peterson (Rotman Institute of Philosophy, University of Western Ontario, CA)
Navigating the transition between research and treatment when integrating novel neuroimaging techniques in medical practice Charles Weijer (Bioethics, University of Western Ontario, CA)
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ASSC 17 Conference (July 12th-15th) Registration Fee for Non-Members -
Registration - $675.00 US:
*All payments must be received by June 12th and will not be refundable after that date. Refunds made prior to June 12th will be subject to a 15% processing fee.
Optional Morning Tutorials (9:00am-12:00pm, July 12th) - $60.00 US each (you can only select 1 morning and/or 1 afternoon tutorial):
TUTORIAL M1 - 9:00am: Using Bayes to Interpret Non-significant Results Zoltan Dienes
TUTORIAL M3 - 9:00AM: First-Person Methods: Philosophers' Dreams or Researchers' Nightmares? Perspectives from Philosophy and the Study of Dreaming Jennifer M. Windt & Sascha Benjamin Fink
TUTORIAL M4 - 9:00AM: Measuring (Un)awareness David Carmel & Steve Fleming
Optional Afternoon Tutorials (1:00pm-4:00pm, July 12th)- $60.00 US each (you can only select 1 morning and/or 1 afternoon tutorial):
TUTORIAL A1 - 1:00PM: Investigating Animal Pain and Consciousness Paula Droege & Victoria Braithwaite
TUTORIAL A2 - 1:00PM: Representational Theories of Consciousness Rocco Gennaro
TUTORIAL A3 - 1:00PM: The Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness Giulio Tononi, Christof Koch, Nao Tsuchiya & Masafumi Oizumi
TUTORIAL A4 - 1:00PM: Deciphering the information contained in patterns of human brain activity Frank Tong
Optional Satellite Symposium - Perception and Action in Immersive Worlds (July 16th) - $60.00 US:
This is a satellite event that is independent of the main ASSC17 conference.
The perfect way to relax after a big day, and an ideal chance to meet other conference participants. The food will be delicious, the company brilliant.
*Includes beer and wine served during dinner.
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Early Registration fees US$ (Now Extended to May 20th*)
Late Registration fees US$ (After May 20th*)
MAIN ASSC17 MEETING (July 12th-15th)
Meeting Registration - ASSC Student Member
$225
$325
Meeting Registration - ASSC Member
$475
$575
Meeting Registration - Non-member
$575
$675
Meeting Banquet (optional)
Regular: $90 Student: $25 (includes beer & wine)
Regular: $90 Student: $25 (includes beer & wine)
Tutorials (July 12th, optional)
$60
$60
Satellite (July 16th, optional)
$60
$60
*Please
note that all payments must be received by June 12th and will not be
refundable after that date. Refunds made prior to June 12th will be
subject to a 15% processing fee.
Note if you have only just applied for membership you
will need to wait a few days for your membership to be processed. You
will recieve an email notification once your login account has been
created.
1) LOGIN: To access the student member conference price you will first need to login. If you are
not logged in, you will see a login window in the top right corner of
this
page (if you are logged in you should see "My account" & "log out"
in that location). Your username will be the email address you provided
with your
membership registration. If your email does not work, try your full name
(e.g. William James). If you are unsure of your password, select
"request new password". If you are having problems loging in please contact the ASSC secretary.
Note
if you have only just applied for membership you will need to wait a
few days for your membership to be processed. You will recieve an email
notification once your login account has been created.
1) LOGIN To access the member conference price you will first need to login. If you are
not logged in, you will see a login window in the top right corner of
this
page (if you are logged in you should see "My account" & "log out"
in that location). Your username will be the email address you provided
with your
membership registration. If your email does not work, try your full name
(e.g. William James). If you are unsure of your password, select
"request new password". If you are having problems loging in please contact the ASSC secretary.
Note: If
you are not currently a member, but would like to take advantage of the
member's discount, please go to our member registration page http://www.theassc.org/join_assc You will need to allow a few days for the membership to be processed
and will be notified once your login account has been created.
The
annual ASSC conferences are intended to promote interdisciplinary
dialogue in the scientific study of consciousness. ASSC members as well
as non-members are encouraged to submit contributions that address
current empirical and theoretical issues in the study of consciousness,
from the perspectives of neuroscience, psychology, medicine, philosophy,
computer science, and cognitive ethology. ASSC17 will provide an
excellent opportunity for the presentation of new empirical findings or
novel theoretical perspectives in an atmosphere that will promote
discussion and debate.
The program committee invites submissions for poster presentations on any topic relevant to the scientific
study of consciousness. Neuroscientific, anthropological, clinical,
evolutionary, psychological, philosophical, or computational
perspectives are all welcome. Any person may present only one
submission, but may be co-author on more than one. Currently, only submissions for posters are being accepted. We
would, however, like you to be aware that there are a limited number of poster spaces available. Posters will be
selected on the basis of highest quality and
relevance to the aims of the ASSC.
All presenters must register for the
conference (registration and payment can be made after acceptance
notification has been received). Please note that author names will be
stripped from submissions prior to review by the committee to encourage
fair evaluation (committee chairs will however have access to this
information).
Please note that, due to the limited time and space available, we will not be able to accept all
abstract submissions. We
apologize in advance for any inconvenience this restriction may cause.
Name and affiliation for all authors (including presenting author).
Track (Neuroscience, Psychology, Philosophy, Clinical or other).
Again, the maximum time alloted for each talk is 20 minutes (including
discussion). Speakers should aim to complete their talk in 15 minutes to
allow 3-4 minutes for questions and speaker transition time. Please note that, due to the limited time and space available, we will not be able to accept all abstract submissions. We apologize in advance for any inconvenience this restriction may cause.
In line with practices at some recent ASSC conferences, abstracts will be judged by the scientific committee "blind" to the list of contributing authors. The abstracts will be judged soley on the quality of the work presented in the abstract and its relevance to consciousness research. Submissions labeled as "POSTER ONLY" will be considered separately and will simply be judged on a decision to accept or reject. The remaining submissions labeled as either "TALK ONLY" or "TALK OR POSTER" will be judged together ("blind" to the submitting authors indication that the abstract will be withdrawn in a talk is not awarded).
TRAVEL AWARD
ASSC17 is seeking funds for travel awards for
young scholars (Ph.D.
student and postdoc within 3 years of graduation). Please check "yes"
if you would like to be considered for an award, should these become
available. We expect to have several travel awards available, in the form of free accommodations at the conference hotel for those students traveling to the conference from outside the San Diego area.
EXPRESS REVIEW
SIf you need an express review for acceptance or rejection of the abstract for your visa applications, select "YES" where the form asks, "Do you need an express review for acceptance or rejection of your
abstract for a visa application?"
NOTE:
Express reviews will be conducted as quickly as possible, but as they
will require the immediate attention of the reviewing committee, we ask that
these requests be limited to only those that need written confirmation
of acceptance to the conference in order to apply for a travel visa
to the US. No decisions regarding talk or poster slots will be
made until the abstract submission period has closed.
STUDENT POSTER COMPETITION
For
each of the poster sessions, there will be one prize awarded for
neuroscience and one prize awarded for philosophy (4 prizes in total).
Posters will be categorized by the judges. The four winners will be presented an award on stage just before the final
keynote of the conference. The winning posters will also be featured on
the ASSC website. The competition is only open to students (post-docs
are not eligible).
If you would like to be considered for the student poster competition, then select "YES" where the form asks, "Would you like to be considered for the student poster prize?"
Note:
Prizes will not be awarded for student talk presentations. So, if you
select "talk or poster" for your presentation and you are awarded a talk, then you will not be considered for the poster prize.
If you have any questions about the abstract submission process, please contact Tobias Schlicht ( tobias.schlicht@ruhr-uni-bochum.de )
POSTER COMPOSITION AND DIMENSIONS
Poster Composition: All posters should include the following: 1) A title in large type with author names and affiliations clearly printed below; 2) the abstract as originally submitted for review; 3) a brief introduction describing the nature and/or history of the problem under investigation; 4) a clear summary of results if the poster is presenting new scientific research; and 5) conclusions in the form of bullet points or a concise descriptive paragraph. Wherever possible, the use of figures and tables is strongly encouraged.
Poster Size: The maximum dimensions for posters are 72 inches wide x 44 inches high (or 182.8 cm. wide x 110 cm. high).
Located
on a lush subtropical setting on a bend in the Brisbane River, the
University of Queensland is an easy ferry ride from downtown Brisbane,
the state capital. July (the Australian winter) is the best season to
visit tropical north Queensland and the Great Barrier Reef.
Note that a week following the ASSC conference the international conference on
cognitive neuroscience (ICON) will be held in Brisbane from July 27th-31st. In addition to the conference there are likely to be a number workshops and satellite events that will be of interest to some of you. Check the website for details www.icon2014.org
Evolutionary theory has yet to offer a detailed
model of the complex transitions from a living system of one design to another
of more advanced, or simply different, design.
Hidden within the writings of evolution’s expositors is an implicit
appeal to AI-like processes operating within the “cosmic machine” that has
hitherto been evolving the plethora of functional living systems we
observe. In these writings, there is
disturbingly little understanding of the deep problems involved, resting as
they do in the very heart of AI. The
end-state requirements for a system, device, or “machine” with intelligence
capable of design are examined. The
representational power must be sufficient to support analogical thought, an
operation demanding transformations of
events in imagery, in turn a function of perception, both dependent on a non-differentiable
flow of time. The operational dynamics
of the device must inherit this fundamental property of the dynamically
transforming matter-field. Whether the evolutionary mechanisms or
algorithmics thus far envisioned by biology or AI are coordinate with such requirements
is left seriously in doubt.
Tutorials: Z. Dienes, R. Gennaro, A.K. Seth & R. Kanai; P. Droege & V. Braithwaite; G. Tononi, C. Koch, N. Tsuchiya & M. Oizumi; D. Carmel & S. Fleming; J.M. Windt & S.M. Fink; F. Tong. Presidential Address: A.K. Engel Welcome Reception
July 13:
Keynotes: I. Fried, S. Gallagher; Symposium: R. Brown, R. Malach, J. Levine & D. Rahnev. Special Roundtable: Debating IIT: G. Tononi, C. Koch, J. Searle & J. Goldman, S. Firestein, moderator Reception, Evening Talks and Music in Honor of G.M. Edelman
July 14:
Keynotes: S. Kastner, P. Cavanagh; Symposium: O. Blanke, T. Metzinger, R. Salomon, A. Serino & F. de Vignemont ASSC 17 Banquet at the Del Coronado Hotel - transportation provided
July 15:
Symposia: L. Melloni, S. Dahaene, M. Pitts & N. Block; A. Owen, L. Naci, B. Young, D. Bor, C. Weijer & A. Peterson ASSC17 Afterparty
July 16:
Satellite Symposium - Perception and Action in Immersive Worlds: S. Gephstein & A. McDowell, Chairs
Organizing Committee: David Edelman (Chair), Edward Vul, Thomas Albright, Gedeon O. Deak, Sergei Gepshtein, Ayse Saygin, Jennifer Goldman
Scientific Program Committee: Tobias Schlicht (Chair), David Edelman, Hakwan Lau, Shimon Edelman, Andreas Engel, Heather Berlin, Masatoshi Yoshida, David Rosenthal, Corrado Sinigaglia, Hal Blumenfeld, Olivia Carter
16th annual meeting of the Association for the Scientific Study of Consciousness
Event Type:
ASSC Conference
Presentation Type:
Talk
Refereed:
No
Publish status:
Unpublished
Abstract:
Normal
0
false
false
false
EN-GB
ZH-CN
HE
A major goal
in consciousness science is to discriminate between unconscious and conscious processes.
Behaviourally, conscious cognition can be inferred by measuring metacognition, (i.e.
knowledge of accuracy of perception, or knowledge of knowing). Metacognition is
however difficult to assess consistently. Under popular signal detection theory
models for stimulus classification tasks, measures such as confidence-accuracy
correlation, and type II d’, are highly sensitive to response biases in both
the type I (classification) and type II (metacognitive) tasks. Maniscalco and Lau (2011; Cons.
Cogn.) recently addressed this issue via a new measure: meta-d’. This is
the type I d’ that would have led to the observed type II data had the subject
used all the type I information. Trivially, meta-d’=d’ irrespective of response
bias when type I and II decisions are based on the same Gaussian signal.
However, its behaviour under more general and empirically plausible scenarios
is unknown. Here, we describe a rigorous set of analytical and simulation
results, leveraging new analytical formulae for meta-d’. We systematically analyse
scenarios in which metacognitive judgments utilize enhanced or degraded
versions of the type I signal, and when decision criteria are jittered. Analytically,
meta-d’ values typically reflect the underlying model well, and are stable under
changes in decision criteria; however, in extreme cases meta-d’ becomes
unstable. Simulations of experiments indicate that data must meet certain
criteria for meta-d’ to be numerically accurate and stable. Our results provide
support for meta-d’ as a useful, stable measure of metacognition, and new
rigorous methodology for its application.
See 01 for Brighton to London (pdf available includes London Victoria and London Bridge. Large print also available).
Options from St Pancras:
Direct train to Brighton (see personalised timetable pdf at bottom of the page)
Tube to London Bridge, then train to Brighton (see Southern Railway timetable 01 for train times)
Tube to Victoria, then train to Brighton (see Southern Railway timetable 01 for train times) or National Express coach to Brighton (see webpage above)
Train to Victoria, then train to Brighton (see Southern Railway timetable 01 for train times) or National Express coach to Brighton (see webpage above)
Travel time from Victoria is about 1 hour; allow about 30 mins to get around by tube within London.
1) Select each of the items that you would like below & press "ADD TO CART." This will automatically load the paypal page showing your selection.
2) If you would like to add more items select "CONTINUE SHOPPING" and add another item.
3) Once you all of your items have been selected all of your items select "CHECKOUT" if you would like to pay with a credit card or "CHECKOUT WITH PAYPAL" if you would like to use a paypal account
4) If the name you provide with the payment details is different to the name you would like on your name tag (or is listed with your abstract) please notify David Schwartzman AFTER you have completed your payment so that your payment/registration details can be appropriately recorded.
PLEASE NOTE:
You do not need a PayPal account to make a payment: simply follow the instructions to pay with or without an account.
You will need to add each item to your cart separately so do not proceed to payment until ALL items are listed.
Optional morning tutorial (July 2) - £40 each (you can only select 1 morning &/or 1 afternoon tute):
TUTORIAL 1-AM: Towards a comprehensive theory of subjectivity and selfhood: Philosophy, cognitive science, neurology and neuroimaging Olaf Blanke & Thomas Metzinger
TUTORIAL 2-AM: Sensory substitution Jamie Ward
TUTORIAL 3-AM: A primer on experimental hypnosis research Devin Terhune
TUTORIAL 4-AM: Self-Knowledge: Philosophy meets Cognitive Science Axel Cleeremans, Morten Overgaard, Bert Timmermans & Ryan Scott
Optional afternoon tutorial (July 2) - £40 each (you can only select 1 morning &/or 1 afternoon tute):
TUTORIAL 1-PM: The Science of Magic: Turning magic into science Gustav Kuhn & Ronald Rensink
TUTORIAL 2-PM: Meditation and consciousness: Two ways meditation can contribute to consciousness science Susan Blackmore
TUTORIAL 3-PM: Neurosurgery and its role in the study of consciousness James Laban, Harutumo Hasegawa & Keyoumars Ashkan
TUTORIAL 4-PM: The phenomenology, neurobiology and neurocognitive basis of depersonalization Heather Berlin & Nick Medford
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successfully tested using Firefox 3.6 (Mac), Safari 4.0.4 (Mac) Chrome 5
(Mac), Firefox 3.5.8 (PC), IE 7 (PC)
If you are having trouble check that you are not using an older
browser. Difficulties have also been experienced when login in remotely
through a VPN connection
Inquiries: If you are having difficulties please contact David Schwartzman
1) Select each of the items that you would like below & press "ADD TO CART." This will automatically load the paypal page showing your selection.
2) If you would like to add more items select "CONTINUE SHOPPING" and add another item.
3) Once you all of your items have been selected all of your items select "CHECKOUT" if you would like to pay with a credit card or "CHECKOUT WITH PAYPAL" if you would like to use a paypal account
4) If the name you provide with the payment details is different to the name you would like on your name tag (or is listed with your abstract) please notify David Schwartzman AFTER you have completed your payment so that your payment/registration details can be appropriately recorded.
PLEASE NOTE:
You do not need a PayPal account to make a payment: simply follow the instructions to pay with or without an account.
You will need to add each item to your cart separately so do not proceed to payment until ALL items are listed.
ASSC 16 Conference registration fee for members (July 3-6) - £280:
Optional morning tutorial (July 2) - £40 each (you can only select 1 morning &/or 1 afternoon tute):
TUTORIAL 1-AM: Towards a comprehensive theory of subjectivity and selfhood: Philosophy, cognitive science, neurology and neuroimaging Olaf Blanke & Thomas Metzinger
TUTORIAL 2-AM: Sensory substitution Jamie Ward & Tom Wright
TUTORIAL 3-AM: A primer on experimental hypnosis research Devin Terhune
TUTORIAL 4-AM: Self-Knowledge: Philosophy meets Cognitive Science Axel Cleeremans, Morten Overgaard, Bert Timmermans & Ryan Scott
Optional afternoon tutorial (July 2) - £40 each (you can only select 1 morning &/or 1 afternoon tute):
TUTORIAL 1-PM: The Science of Magic: Turning magic into science Gustav Kuhn & Ronald Rensink
TUTORIAL 2-PM: Meditation and consciousness: Two ways meditation can contribute to consciousness science Susan Blackmore
TUTORIAL 3-PM: Neurosurgery and its role in the study of consciousness James Laban, Harutumo Hasegawa & Keyoumars Ashkan
TUTORIAL 4-PM: The phenomenology, neurobiology and neurocognitive basis of depersonalization Heather Berlin & Nick Medford
System requirements: The PayPal link has been successfully tested using Firefox 3.6 (Mac), Safari 4.0.4 (Mac) Chrome 5 (Mac), Firefox 3.5.8 (PC), IE 7 (PC)
If you are having trouble check that you are not using an older browser. Difficulties have also been experienced when login in remotely through a VPN connection
Inquiries: If you are having difficulties please contact David Schwartzman
This article re-examines Ned Block‘s (1997, 2007) conceptual distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness. His argument that we can have phenomenally conscious representations without being able to cognitively access them is criticized as not being supported by evidence. Instead, an alternative interpretation of the relevant empirical data is offered which leaves the link between phenomenology and accessibility intact. Moreover, it is shown that Block’s claim that phenomenology and accessibility have different neural substrates is highly problematic in light of empirical evidence. Finally, his claim that there can be phenomenology without cognitive accessibility is at odds with his endorsement of the 'same-order-theory' of consciousness.
A recent measure of ‘integrated information’, Phi_DM, quantifies the extent to which a system generates more information thanthe sum of its parts as it transitions between states, possibly reflecting levels of consciousness generated by neural systems.However, Phi_DM is defined only for discrete Markov systems, which are unusual in biology; as a result, Phi_DM can rarely bemeasured in practice. Here, we describe two new measures, Phi_E and Phi_AR, that overcome these limitations and are easy toapply to time-series data. We use simulations to demonstrate the in-practice applicability of our measures, and to exploretheir properties. Our results provide new opportunities for examining information integration in real and model systems andcarry implications for relations between integrated information, consciousness, and other neurocognitive processes.However, our findings pose challenges for theories that ascribe physical meaning to the measured quantities.
Changes in conscious level have been associated with changes in dynamical integration and segregation among distributedbrain regions. Recent theoretical developments emphasize changes in directed functional (i.e., causal) connectivity asreflected in quantities such as ‘integrated information’ and ‘causal density’. Here we develop and illustrate a rigorousmethodology for assessing causal connectivity from electroencephalographic (EEG) signals using Granger causality (GC).Our method addresses the challenges of non-stationarity and bias by dividing data into short segments and applyingpermutation analysis. We apply the method to EEG data obtained from subjects undergoing propofol-induced anaesthesia,with signals source-localized to the anterior and posterior cingulate cortices. We found significant increases in bidirectionalGC in most subjects during loss-of-consciousness, especially in the beta and gamma frequency ranges. Corroborating aprevious analysis we also found increases in synchrony in these ranges; importantly, the Granger causality analysis showedhigher inter-subject consistency than the synchrony analysis. Finally, we validate our method using simulated datagenerated from a model for which GC values can be analytically derived. In summary, our findings advance themethodology of Granger causality analysis of EEG data and carry implications for integrated information and causal densitytheories of consciousness.
Solving the problem of consciousness remains one of the biggest challenges in modern science. One key step towards understanding consciousness is to empirically narrow down neural processes associated with the subjective experience of a particular content. To unravel these neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) a common scientific strategy is to compare perceptual conditions in which consciousness of a particular content is present with those in which it is absent, and to determine differences in measures of brain activity (the so called “contrastive analysis”). However, this comparison appears not to reveal exclusively the NCC, as the NCC proper can be confounded with prerequisites for and consequences of conscious processing of the particular content. This implies that previous results cannot be unequivocally interpreted as reflecting the neural correlates of conscious experience. Here we review evidence supporting this conjecture and suggest experimental strategies to untangle the NCC from the prerequisites and consequences of conscious experience in order to further develop the otherwise valid and valuable contrastive methodology.
Note if you have only just applied for membership you
will need to wait a few days for your membership to be processed. You
will recieve an email notification once your login account has been
created.
1) LOGIN To access the student member conference price you will first need to login. If you are
not logged in, you will see a login window in the top right corner of
this
page (if you are logged in you should see "My account" & "log out"
in that location). Your username will be the email address you provided
with your
membership registration. If your email does not work, try your full name
(e.g. William James). If you are unsure of your password, select
"request new password". If you are having problems loging in please contact the ASSC secretary.
Note
if you have only just applied for membership you will need to wait a
few days for your membership to be processed. You will recieve an email
notification once your login account has been created.
1) LOGIN To access the member conference price you will first need to login. If you are
not logged in, you will see a login window in the top right corner of
this
page (if you are logged in you should see "My account" & "log out"
in that location). Your username will be the email address you provided
with your
membership registration. If your email does not work, try your full name
(e.g. William James). If you are unsure of your password, select
"request new password". If you are having problems loging in please contact the ASSC secretary.
Note: If
you are not currently a member but would like to take advantage of the
member's discount please go to our member registration page http://www.theassc.org/join_assc you will need to allow a few days for the membership to be processed and will be notified once your login account has been created.
We are working closely with ‘Visit Brighton’ the official Tourism site for Brighton, www.visitbrighton.com who will take care of your accommodation requirements, whether it’s a 4 star hotel by the sea, or a cosy B & B!
We
have bedroom allocations at hotels close to the main conference venue –
Brighton Dome Complex and the Tutorials venue - The Puma (Formally know as the Barceló Old Ship Hotel).
Planning to attend the ASSC meeting in Brighton? Want to save money and get to know your colleagues?
Before booking your accommodation, don't forget to check out our ASSC Roomshare Forum.
It's an online forum where you can connect with other conference
participants in order to share a room at the conference hotel or a
nearby hostel.
Click the following link to view your room share options:
Venue: Michael Chowen Lecture Theatre, (BSMS) Brighton & Sussex Medical School - Teaching Building (No 46 on map at bottom of page).
Registration: £30 for the full day - Note there is a capacity limit of 140 people. Online registration is open.
It is not necessary to register for the main ASSC conference in order to attend the Satellite event.
Organizers:
Dr Nick Medford (Brighton and Sussex Medical School)
Ms Hazelle Woodhurst (University of Sussex)
Contact: For questions regarding logistics or travel arrangments contact Hazelle Woodhurst
Summary: Psychiatric disorders entail disturbances of first-person experience, such as altered mood or anomalous perceptions. To what extent can they be considered consciousness disorders? And what can theoretical approaches to consciousness gain from considering the mental and biological disturbances that are seen in clinical neurology? The disturbances that arise in neuropsychiatric disorders can provide clues to the underlying structure of conscious awareness itself. In this satellite symposium, a range of medical neuroscientists will address these issues, covering such topics as disturbances of volition, anomalies of self-representation, and the interaction of body and brain. Recommended for clinicians interested in consciousness science, and for consciousness scientists wishing to learn more about the functions and dysfunctions of consciousness.
Event: This is a satellite event to be held immediately after the 16th annual meeting of the association for the scientific study of
consciousness. [Click here for link to ASSC16].
Program
9.15-9.30 Welcome and Introduction - Dr Nick Medford, Prof Hugo Critchley
9.30-10.30 Keynote lecture: ‘The neuropsychiatry of core and extended consciousness’ - Prof Adam Zeman
10.30-11.10 ‘Self-representation, neurovisceral phenotypes and anxiety’ - Prof Hugo Critchley
11.10-11.30 Coffee
11.30-12.10 ‘Premonitory urges and sensory tics: is Tourette syndrome a pathology of consciousness?’ - Dr Andrea Cavanna
12.10-12.50 ‘Psychogenic movement disorders: why and how’ – Dr Valerie Voon
12.50-14.00 Lunch
14.00-14.40 ’Selves unreal and divided: dissociation and psychosis’- Dr Nick Medford
14.40-15.20 ‘Body perception illusions in epilepsy’- Dr Lukas Heydrich
15.20-15.40 Coffee
15.40-16.20 ‘Hypnosis, Consciousness, and Dissociation’- Dr Quinton Deeley
16.20-17.00 ‘The role of the body in emotional experience’- Dr Neil Harrison
Venue: Michael Chowen Lecture Theatre, (BSMS) Brighton & Sussex Medical School - Teaching Building (No 46)
Travel: if travelling from overseas or within the UK to the University of Sussex, Brighton and Sussex Medical School (BSMS) http://www.sussex.ac.uk/aboutus/findus/uktravel
By Train: If arriving by Train into Brighton please take a connecting train to Falmer Station for the University.
National Rail Enquiries http://www.nationalrail.co.uk/
By Car
Should you prefer to come by car, the closest car park to the Medical school is car park 3 in Biology Road, which is parallel to the BSMS Teaching Building. The medical school has long white steps at the front leading up to its entrance and will be signposted outside for the satellite symposium.
By Taxi
Taxis are available at both Brighton and Lewes train stations and at many places in the centre of Brighton.
It is about four miles (six kilometres) from central Brighton to the University. (There is no taxi service at Falmer station itself.)
Accommodation
For details about accommodation opitons in the Brighton area please click here
We propose that human cognition consists of cascading cycles of recurring brain events. Each cognitive cycle senses the current situation, interprets it with reference to ongoing goals, and then selects an internal or external action in response. While most aspects of the cognitive cycle are unconscious, each cycle also yields a momentary ‘‘ignition’’ of conscious broadcasting. Neuroscientists have independently proposed ideas similar to the cognitive cycle, the fundamental hypothesis of the LIDA model of cognition. High-level cognition, such as deliberation, planning, etc., is typically enabled by multiple cognitive cycles. In this paper we describe a timing model LIDA’s cognitive cycle. Based on empirical and simulation data we propose that an initial phase of perception (stimulus recognition) occurs 80–100 ms from stimulus onset under optimal conditions. It is followed by a conscious episode (broadcast) 200–280 ms after stimulus onset, and an action selection phase 60–110 ms from the start of the conscious phase. One cognitive cycle would therefore take 260–390 ms. The LIDA timing model is consistent with brain evidence indicating a fundamental role for a theta-gamma wave, spreading forward from sensory cortices to rostral corticothalamic regions. This posteriofrontal theta-gamma wave may be experienced as a conscious perceptual event starting at 200–280 ms post stimulus. The action selection component of the cycle is proposed to involve frontal, striatal and cerebellar regions. Thus the cycle is inherently recurrent, as the anatomy of the thalamocortical system suggests. The LIDA model fits a large body of cognitive and neuroscientific evidence. Finally, we describe two LIDA-based software agents: the LIDA Reaction Time agent that simulates human performance in a simple reaction time task, and the LIDA Allport agent which models phenomenal simultaneity within timeframes comparable to human subjects. While there are many models of reaction time performance, these results fall naturally out of a biologically and computationally plausible cognitive architecture.
We propose that human cognition consists of cascading cycles of recurring brain events. Each cognitive cycle senses the current situation, interprets it with reference to ongoing goals, and then selects an internal or external action in response. While most aspects of the cognitive cycle are unconscious, each cycle also yields a momentary ‘‘ignition’’ of conscious broadcasting. Neuroscientists have independently proposed ideas similar to the cognitive cycle, the fundamental hypothesis of the LIDA model of cognition. High-level cognition, such as deliberation, planning, etc., is typically enabled by multiple cognitive cycles. In this paper we describe a timing model LIDA’s cognitive cycle. Based on empirical and simulation data we propose that an initial phase of perception (stimulus recognition) occurs 80–100 ms from stimulus onset under optimal conditions. It is followed by a conscious episode (broadcast) 200–280 ms after stimulus onset, and an action selection phase 60–110 ms from the start of the conscious phase. One cognitive cycle would therefore take 260–390 ms. The LIDA timing model is consistent with brain evidence indicating a fundamental role for a theta-gamma wave, spreading forward from sensory cortices to rostral corticothalamic regions. This posteriofrontal theta-gamma wave may be experienced as a conscious perceptual event starting at 200–280 ms post stimulus. The action selection component of the cycle is proposed to involve frontal, striatal and cerebellar regions. Thus the cycle is inherently recurrent, as the anatomy of the thalamocortical system suggests. The LIDA model fits a large body of cognitive and neuroscientific evidence. Finally, we describe two LIDA-based software agents: the LIDA Reaction Time agent that simulates human performance in a simple reaction time task, and the LIDA Allport agent which models phenomenal simultaneity within timeframes comparable to human subjects. While there are many models of reaction time performance, these results fall naturally out of a biologically and computationally plausible cognitive architecture.
